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INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME 17 (SPRING 2016)

Although this is the 17th volume, this issue is the first of the *Journal of Christianity and World Languages*, formerly the *Journal of Christianity and Foreign Languages*. In its silver anniversary year, 2015, the North American Christian Foreign Language Association voted to change its name to the Christian Association of World Languages and also to change the name of this journal that it sponsors. There was good reason to do so. There has been a movement afoot for many years to recognize the unintentional baggage of the word “foreign” when referring to academic departments and describing the process of language acquisition and the study of literatures and cultures. Using “world languages” takes the sting of “otherness” out of our relationships with the cultures we teach. Though this movement may have begun in the secular world, we thought as a Christian organization that we could articulate a biblical reason for recognizing the equality of all languages in affirming in the organization’s name that all people of every culture share in the image of God.

In addition to the new names of the journal and our sponsoring organization, this issue also marks the first that we have edited from Baylor University. It is with a great deal of trepidation and humility that we undertake this new responsibility. The editors who have gone before us—Phyllis Mitchell at Wheaton College, David Smith, Dianne Zandstra, and Cynthia Slagter at Calvin College—have set a very high bar, indeed, and we want to thank them with new found appreciation for all the work that they have sacrificially given over years of service to make the journal what it is today.

Our mission remains the same. *JCWL* exists “to provide a forum for educators who wish to publish research undertaken from a Christian

perspective.” Each of our articles demonstrates new and innovative ways in which our Christian faith can impact language learning and the study of world literature. It is fitting that our first article in this Spring 2016 issue is by David Smith, a pioneer in this endeavor and an editor of this journal for over ten years. His plenary address, given at the 2015 meeting of NACFLA at Biola University, challenges us again to think Christianly about pedagogical strategies. He points out that while the Christian scholarship movement is alive and well in articulating a Christian worldview when critiquing the foundational theories of various disciplines, it lacks that same attention towards pedagogical classroom issues. What follows is a model of what he is calling for—concrete ways in which his faith commitments affect every aspect of his teaching strategy. As always, Smith leads by example, not by claiming a “right” way but by showing how his pedagogical strategies are implicitly and explicitly Christian.

Equally careful is Karol Hardin’s study of the understanding and the use of the word *lie* (as in falsehood) across cultures. Hardin is a linguist with expertise in the area of pragmatics. Her research is detailed, extensive, and wholly transparent as she makes her claims about the differences in the understanding of what constitutes a lie. Her methodology is the same as it would be for any linguist, but her conclusions are shaped by her faith. All students of languages should be aware of the complexity of the concept of the lie, but Christian language educators have a special responsibility to use these findings to help their students negotiate morally ambiguous situations, realizing that first language assumptions about lies and lying cannot be carried over to other cultures.

The Forum contribution for this issue is really a companion piece to Hardin’s article. Julie Woolfolk explains the impact that Hardin’s research has had in her own classroom. Julie Woolfolk is a co-researcher with Hardin in her study and is the “Eichelberger” cited several times throughout the article. Knowing the importance of the implications of the research, she takes some of the same hypothetical situations into her beginning Spanish classes and reports her observations on how those discussions changed her students’ perceptions and judgments of others.

Finally, it is likely that Victor Velázquez’s article will introduce many of our readers to an area of literary criticism about which we have known

little up until now. Velázquez deals in ecocriticism, an area of investigation that now has its own “Forum” group that is part of the Modern Language Association’s lineup of sub-disciplines, study groups that have regular communication through the MLA. Velázquez explains that ecocriticism seeks to look at literature to evaluate the ways in which humans relate to non-human life. Current thought, looking at more recent English literature, has severely criticized the role that Christianity has had in engendering destructive attitudes when it comes to the environment. As a corrective to this negative view of Christianity’s role in undervaluing the natural order, Velázquez looks at the literary production of two French authors from the sixteenth century, Montaigne and Du Bellay.

Our 17th volume is rounded out by Jennifer Good’s insightful review of a new collection of essays on Kafka: *Kafka und die Religion in der Moderne/Kafta: Religion and Modernity*. This volume is of interest because it seeks to go beyond the received wisdom that religion had little to do with the work of this alienated Jew. The review helps the reader negotiate the essays which take up well known works such as *The Castle* and *The Trial* and find religious themes and theological import in both.

We commend to your reading all of the articles and thank our authors for their patience in the process of putting this first issue to press. We are much in the debt of the most recent editors Cynthia Slagter and Dianne Zandstra for their sage advice and quick response to an untold number of emails. We would like to especially thank Elizabeth Sands Wise, our production assistant, for her patience with us. We are the neophytes. She is the seasoned professional that made all of the issue look good.

May God continue to use this journal and us in His service as we fulfill the calling He has given us all in the world language classroom.

Jan E. Evans and Jennifer L. Good
Baylor University

PATTERNS OF PRACTICE AND WEBS OF BELIEF IN THE LANGUAGE CLASSROOM¹

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THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLARSHIP MOVEMENT in North American Christian higher education has been more successful in focusing on questions arising from disciplinary theory than in illuminating how faith informs pedagogical practice. This article begins from extended interpretation of a brief episode of teaching in a second language classroom and draws upon accounts of the role of imagination in social practice to elucidate how faith, as part of a web of beliefs and assumptions, can structure the shared practice of teaching and learning. It is argued that preaching and modeling are inadequate to account for the role of faith in practice; it is rather at the intersection of embodied practice and shared imagination that faith more fully informs pedagogical patterns.

In 1991, Boris Yeltsin won the first free presidential elections in Russia, Lech Wałęsa became president of Poland, Microsoft Office had just been released, Mariah Carey was the best new artist at the Grammy Awards, and a small group of Christian language faculty gathered to launch a

i. This paper was presented as the keynote address at the twenty-fifth annual NAC-FLA conference at Biola University, La Mirada, CA. Although the oral presentation differed somewhat from this version, this version was its basis, and so I have retained the more oral form and minimal referencing.

fledgling organization with an unpronounceable name.² This last debut was probably the least auspicious, and not only because it was small and unheralded. It was not long before this that I began my teaching career and also began pursuing my own interest in the relationship between being Christian and being a language educator. It tended to strike colleagues as a bizarre interest to pursue. What could faith have to do with language pedagogy? Was I going to find some weird teaching method in the Bible? Wasn't German grammar the same for everyone? As one colleague memorably put it, was there a Christian way to boil water? And yet, a couple of name changes later, that fledgling organization still exists. Somehow there was enough to talk about for a quarter century.

Since 1991, the majority of NACFLA conference presentations and of publications in the *Journal of Christianity and Foreign Languages* have been on literary and cultural topics.³ That is understandable; these topics resonate in many cases with our own disciplinary formation, and they are more obviously ideological and susceptible to faith-informed angles than questions in language acquisition. Talking about teaching and learning have, moreover, long carried lower status and fewer rewards in the academy. The pervasive influence of positivist frameworks has made it harder to conceive of language pedagogy as anything other than a matter of what works, what successfully and efficiently brings about measurable increments in language proficiency. Moreover, the Christian scholarship movement in North American Christian higher education, out of which NACFLA emerged, has been focused on ideas more than on practices. What came to be called the "integration of faith and learning" was structured as a conversation about how Christian ideas relate to disciplinary ideas, and out of over 9000 articles generated by the various Christian scholarly journals associated with the movement, less than five per cent of articles outside the discipline of education have had anything to say—anything at all, even a paragraph—about questions of pedagogy

2. What is now the Christian Association for World Languages began life as NAAC-FLLF, the North American Association of Christian Foreign Language and Literature Faculty, before continuing as NACFLA, the North American Christian Foreign Language Association.

3. For a review of the first decade of *JCFL*, see "Comprehensive Bibliography."

and student formation (Smith, Um, and Beversluis 2014). The *Journal of Christianity and Foreign Languages*, I should add, has given more attention to pedagogy than any of its peer Christian journals, with a third of its articles touching on teaching and learning in some form. Nevertheless, it still seems to me that our work on language pedagogy specifically could be more robust, and that is the topic I hope to address today, in a way that both draws on some themes of the first twenty-five years and points to work ahead.

My aim here is to proceed in a manner that takes the concrete moves of pedagogical practice seriously and does not escape too quickly into theological or philosophical principle. I am going to start with the practical, beginning not from theory but from classroom practices and working my way back to the question of what might be Christian about language pedagogy.

Nine Minutes of Teaching

And so to class. Imagine the following activity, used at the beginning of the fall semester in a second-year language class. It is not particularly original, not particularly complex, and not particularly religious, so it will serve as a useful starting point. Before the class begins, I arrange the chairs into groups of four. When the students arrive, I briefly introduce myself and then ask them to form pairs. The students are given two minutes each to introduce themselves in German to their partners, four minutes total. I then ask them to form into groups of four, and tell them that they should spend one minute each introducing their partners to the rest of the group based on what they heard during the first conversation. This takes another four minutes, after which we move to a whole-class activity. We are by this point about nine minutes into the semester.

I do not claim this activity as original or unique, but want to consider some of the complexity of what is happening in just such an apparently innocuous teaching and learning sequence, so that when we talk about faith and pedagogy we are not assuming an over-simplified image of what happens within classrooms.

The Web of Intentions

Picture the visible moves in this activity as the drops of dew on the strands of a web of assumptions and intentions, intricately interconnected, sometimes in tension, yet all contributing to the visible pattern. Thinking in terms of a web⁴ might help us avoid foundationalist metaphors and the feeling that some of the following considerations are the “real” ones while others are secondary. All play interconnected roles.

Some of my reasons for beginning class in this way have to do straightforwardly with my assumptions about language acquisition. If I ask the students individually who they are and where they are from, leading from the front of the class, I will do most of the speaking, while students will only speak for perhaps thirty seconds each. This configuration gives me three minutes of speaking and five minutes of listening for nine minutes of class time. The switch part way through forces a grammatical change from first person to third person while keeping the topic stable, and the change of audience sustains meaningful repetition of the same information. I get to circulate and assess levels of competence as students speak, the activity signals that communication is important to the course, and managing time tightly keeps students on task and prevents a lapse into native language chatter. I teach this way assuming that there are benefits to language acquisition.

Yet language acquisition is never the sole concern. As I plan my starting activity, I also have in mind strategic considerations concerning space and time. If I leave the room in its default layout (which in the minds of my students is rows of chairs facing the front) and ask students to form pairs, I will lose time to momentary chaos. I will also distract students with the cognitive burden of navigating social awkwardness while choosing a partner. In the activity as described, students still get a choice of partners (possibly adding some small increment of engagement and motivation), but it is a constrained, swift, and fairly painless choice. Placing chairs in fours, rather than twos, both enables initial choice and eases the transition from the first conversation to the second.

4. The idea of a web of beliefs dimly echoes Quine and Ullian.

I have also considered how time is allocated, giving myself eight minutes that I would not have if I were orchestrating from the front. I use this time to make a general assessment of proficiency levels, but I also use it to learn students' names. This particular arrangement of space and time makes it quite feasible to learn twenty to thirty names within the first eight minutes of class. Experience tells me that if I am teaching from the front, even if I ask names they will pass rapidly through my brain without taking up residence. This has much to do with my own cognitive load. On the first day of the semester I am working through the usual teacher anxieties (Will this go well? What will these students be like? Will this be the group that discovers I am a fraud?), managing complex tasks (Did I keep my questions simple enough? Did I call on that person yet? Am I favoring male students? Is my tone supportive?), and, like my students, only beginning to get back into the rhythms of the classroom. There is little capacity for remembering names. By taking myself out of this position I have given myself eight minutes of not performing so that I can actually concentrate on names. The seating layout makes the task easier too—learning names in groups of four is much more effective than trying to map names onto the whole class. This activity allows me to squat briefly by each student's chair and ask and repeat every name while looking the students in the face and seeing *each person* rather than the class I need to manage.

This opens up another layer of considerations concerning affective factors. Most students in the class do not know each other. Some are first-year students. Many are anxious about the prospect of having to perform in a second language, especially before peers and a professor. I try to manage the affective challenge by combining an easy topic with a graded audience: first speak to one person, then review the same material with three people, and only then risk speaking before the whole group. The name-learning process has enabled me to demonstrate respect for students by knowing their names before calling on them in class, and learning names while crouched by individuals and making eye contact ameliorates the inevitable power differential between me and

the student.⁵ Every student has been actively recognized and heard by fellow students and by me within the first few minutes, reducing perceived isolation. The degree of safety sensed by students is likely to affect the degree of oral participation, which will likely in turn affect language acquisition outcomes. Yet I am also concerned with student safety on its own terms.⁶ One year in this class I had a student with a significant stutter that manifested under stress. Speaking German in front of peers counted as stressful, and led to extended episodes of stuttering. If I do not listen in on students in smaller settings before placing a student in the spotlight with a whole-class question, I risk my first interaction with the class being to ask this student a public question, causing distress for all concerned. This is just one particularly visible instance of the potential threats to student safety in classrooms.

At the same time, I am not after complete relaxation – at one point I have deliberately *increased* stress a little. I could have asked students to introduce themselves to a partner and then to the group, but instead I asked them to introduce their partner to the group. I could have told them at the beginning that this was going to happen, and they might have listened more intently during the first conversation as a result. My concern, however, is that doing so creates the message: listen to others in class when the teacher tells you that you need to. This could turn attentiveness to others into an occasional assignment rather than an internalized commitment. I do not expect overwhelming results from this first small intervention, but I do hope that the small moment of panic that occurs when I give the second set of instructions and students realize they were not listening to their partner terribly well offers a first impetus to the message that listening to others matters as much as speaking, and matters all the time.⁷

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5. On the relationship of name learning to classroom ethos, respect, and hospitality, see further Stratman.
 6. On students' perceptions of safety in the classroom—and some of the forms of threat they encounter—see further Call.
 7. It is perhaps worth noting in addition that the more tradition model of the teacher asking students their names from the front does less to encourage listening to others, given the likelihood that students who have not been asked yet are rehearsing

Finally, the calendar is relevant. It not practicable to plan each nine-minute segment of the semester in this much detail, but the beginning of the semester is disproportionately important. The opening minutes are not for handing out syllabi, but for setting learning trajectories. One study found that when students were given course evaluation forms after just two weeks of class, the results did not differ from the same forms filled out at the end of the semester (Buchert et al.).⁸ First impressions help to shape expectations and future patterns of response, and I do myself and my students a favor if I reflect carefully on what happens at the very beginning and the kind of ethos that is projected into the future.

Some Initial Observations

The point here is not to present this activity as a template for how everyone should begin class—it is just a particular learning activity among many. The point is also not to imply that the judgments just outlined are definitive; I hope they are reasonably informed, but like all instructors I continue to learn from students, from colleagues, from research literature, and from the tensions in my own convictions. What we have here is a particular web of assumptions that could look different in another teacher's classroom. These will become more complex still as the semester unfolds and various forms of course content come into play. My concern in unpacking this beginning in some detail has been to provide a sufficiently rich picture of teaching. I offer four basic observations at this point.

First, while language learning remained the fundamental goal, the choices that went into constructing this teaching and learning sequence

for when they will have to respond in German while those who have been asked already are safe for a short while and can disengage or focus on reviewing their brief performance. This can, of course, be modified in various other ways, such as asking other members of the class to recall what the last few students said. The point here is that across various permutations of opening activity, the degree to which listening to others actually (as opposed to in the hopeful but often irrelevant rhetoric of syllabus statements) matters is a variable affected by pedagogical decisions.

8. I am grateful to my colleague, Michael Stob, for pointing me to this article.

were underdetermined by language acquisition concerns alone. This is normal. An array of concerns that are in themselves non-linguistic—student safety and affective well-being, strategic use of space and time, respect and recognition, managing of cognitive load, creating ethos, and so on—are in play when we decide how to teach language.

Second, all of these layers are in play simultaneously—we do not focus on language acquisition for a few minutes and then reflect for a moment on how we value hearing one another before taking a moment to check on affect. While these can in some measure be abstracted for separate analysis, within concrete practice they happen simultaneously. In lived reality, it is never accurate to say “I am just teaching a language” (Smith, “Spiritual Ecology”).

Third, although none of the choices described are choices that only a Christian could make, and nowhere in this sequence has religion been mentioned in class, some of the choices are in fact steered by my own efforts to teach in a manner consistent with my Christian convictions. The focus on the importance of hearing others and of recognizing and respecting each individual, the concern for student safety, and the aim of creating a hospitable classroom are all contingently yet concretely related in my own thinking to theologically tethered commitments that are part of my Christian identity. Others could ground similar moves in different ways, but that is not of immediate concern to my own effort to be faithful to my own core commitments.

Fourth, although the moves described are not uniquely Christian, that does not mean that they are generic or value-neutral. Compare the following account of an ethics seminar at the London Institute of Education in the 1970s under Robert Dearden. As David Bridges reports, an Australian woman raised her voice in class:

“Excuse me,” she intervened, nervously but with some determination, “but do you think we might begin by introducing ourselves, so that we know a little about each other? Otherwise we’re just, well . . .”

“. . . just sources of argument?” offered Dearden.

“Yes.”

“Well, that’s exactly what you are here – sources of argument. It does not matter who you are or where you come from. What matters is the quality of your argument. If you want to know more about each other then you can meet in the pub afterwards. Now, on virtue . . .” (Bridges 1)

This is consistent with certain modern epistemologies, as well as with an ethics that sees equality as secured by the elision of particularity. It is congruous with some past forms of language pedagogy that systemically subsumed learner identity to linguistic or behavioral system. It sits ill alongside an ethic of hospitality. Although the moves described in our opening activity are not uniquely or necessarily tied to Christian convictions, nevertheless they are grounded in particular value commitments and are to some degree controversial in a manner relevant to faith commitments. Being Christian forces me to choose.

We are not yet at the point where anything *explicitly* Christian has taken place. However, we can already glimpse how language pedagogy can involve a web of intentions and decisions in which reflective Christian commitments may be a relevant strand. This does not happen, in this instance, through pausing for prayer or using religious language; the underlying value commitments are simultaneous with and intertwined with the other strands of practice.

Implicit and Explicit

So what about the explicitly Christian? Is this implicit interweaving of strategy and ethos enough or does there need to be a naming of some kind for ongoing pedagogical choices to count as Christian in a stronger sense? To get at this question I suggest we reflect further on a theme that has already been emerging: the role of imagination, in the sense of our web of assumptions and beliefs, in sustaining and shaping practice. In his account of *Communities of Practice*, Etienne Wenger writes:

two stonecutters . . . are asked what they are doing. One responds: “I am cutting this stone in a perfectly square shape.” The other responds: “I am building a cathedral.” Both answers are correct and meaningful, but they reflect different relations to the world. The difference between these answers does not imply that one is a better stonecutter than the other, as far as holding the chisel is concerned. At the level of engagement, they may well be doing exactly the same thing. But it does suggest that their experiences of what they are doing and their sense of self in doing it are rather different. This difference is a function of imagination. As a result, they may be learning very different things from the same activity. (Wenger 176)

Wenger points here to the role of imagination in generating the meaning of practice. Returning to my language classroom, it matters not only what value-informed choices I make as I structure the teaching and learning sequence, but also how students interpret what is happening, the framework of meaning within which they discern value in the moves that we make together. Students who have different internal accounts of what is happening may be having different educational experiences, learning different things, from the same activities. Pedagogy is not just linear cause and effect, it is also about how meaning is discerned. And this in turn is not just a matter of individual, internal frames of reference—*shared* meanings get built up within a learning group over time through what Wenger calls an “infrastructure of imagination” (Wenger 238), a shared set of implicit and explicit cues in the practice environment that help sustain particular interpretations of what it is that we are doing together.

Framing Shared Imagination

Let me illustrate this with another concrete example from the language classroom. Some years ago I encountered Zach, a Christian first-year college student just embarking on his required foreign language sequence. As usual, I had scheduled individual ten-minute conversations with my

students in the first week of the semester to connect with them outside the framework of performance and evaluation. Zach seized the opportunity to let me know, very courteously but also very firmly, that he thought it an injustice that he was being made to learn a foreign language. He was not good at language learning, he said, saw little value in it for his chosen career, had little motivation, and given the high cost of college he felt that his personal resources were being misappropriated. He assured me that he would be cooperative, but wanted me to know how he felt. I thanked him for his honesty and we parted amicably. One part of the concrete infrastructure of imagination in that course was a weekly encounter with a series of biblical texts, building in a narrative arc from the Old Testament into the New, that dealt in various ways with the Bible's call to love foreigners and exercise hospitality to strangers (Smith and Carvill 3-17). It was mid-semester before Zach reappeared at my office. The series of texts we had been considering was, to use his term, "wild." He was captivated by the idea that learning a foreign language was connected to loving neighbors and not just achieving grades. Was there anything further on the topic that he could read? he wondered. He read what I gave him, returning for more a week later. He approached me again at the end of the semester, asking if he could interview me for a paper he had to write. He had to compose an argumentative essay for another class, and had chosen to write on the topic "why every freshman at a Christian college should be made to learn a foreign language."

I mention Zach's story not to imply that such dramatic transformations are typical or that I have some reliable technique for eliciting them, but to illustrate a shift from carving square stones to building cathedrals. As learning became reframed through an infrastructure of imagination that included weekly theological reflection, the larger Christian framework and first-year programming of the college, and his own developing relationship to his Christian faith, the meaning of what we were doing in class shifted for him quite significantly. I do not have evidence of how it impacted his language acquisition, though insofar as motivation and psychological distance are factors in the language acquisition process, I suspect the impact was positive. Imagination and practice intersect.

Imagination and Practice

My opening example focused on teacher decisions about classroom moves, while Zach's story focused on one student response to an infrastructure of imagination. My third example focuses on the interaction between the two, between imagination and practice. It begins with a passage about the Reformation that has stayed with me for some time:

For Zwingli, as for Augustine, sin was no more than self-love: sin consisted in valuing oneself over others and conceiving of others and of God in terms of one's own self . . . It was to measure others in reference to oneself, to enter into social relations out of self-interest. Worship was the counteraction of self-love. The worship of God was the movement of the soul, from self-love, self-orientation, to God and outward to others: honoring them, according humanity equal value to oneself, and according God greater value than oneself. (Wandel 286)

The passage encapsulates important Christian emphases. Sin curves us into ourselves, leads us to make ourselves and our prejudices the measure of the value of others, and turns others into mere means to our ends. Worship turns us outward from self toward God and neighbor and calls us to honor others as having the same value in the sight of God that we have ourselves. This succinct summary helped bring into focus for me some pedagogical unease. In the communicative language course materials with which I began my career, and in the ways I learned to use them, students' oral production often focused on three kinds of language production. First, students might be describing themselves, their family, their hobbies, their house, their preferences, their activities, their vacations, their ailments, and so on. Second, they might be asking speakers of the target language to give them things (items from the restaurant menu, hotel rooms, train tickets, and so on). Repetitive practice was predominantly invested in acts of telling others about ourselves or obtaining services from others for ourselves. This often involved dialogs in which one student would play the part of, say, the hotel receptionist.

Since, however, none of my students (in an urban high school in England in an area of high unemployment and social need and low mobility) were ever seriously imagining themselves in the role of a German hotel receptionist, this part came across in the end as a fiction to enable the self-focused utterances. Textbooks commonly included complaining as a language function to master, but neglected to teach how to encourage, console, sympathize, or praise. Sin, said Zwingli and Augustine, was “to measure others in reference to oneself, to enter into social relations out of self-interest” (Wandel 286). It would be facile to see this as rendering all functional or self-narrating interactions sinful; but at what point does the dominant pedagogical repertoire begin to offer a pattern of practice and an infrastructure of imagination that reinforce rather than challenge the sinful tendency to make even the languages of others one more tool for seeking our own good?

I mentioned three kinds of oral production. The third involved narrating banal details of the days of German people who appeared too briefly and insubstantially to ever take on the force of the human. Georg is playing tennis. Sabine is buying a shirt. Besides their brevity of existence, these people were imaged in one of two ways: mediocre cartoon pictures and awkward photos typically devoid of contextual complexity. Both tended to be designed for minimum ambiguity in order to provide supportive cues for linguistic comprehension. The result tended to be a collection of flat surfaces with little human depth, subtlety, or complexity; these kinds of images rarely evoke compassion, empathy, or the impulse to “honor . . . humanity [as of] equal value to oneself” (Wandel 286).

I do not mean to claim that every language classroom has the same weaknesses that I found in mine and have just described; each has its own ways of falling short. My interest here is in how faith was involved in reflecting on and transforming my pedagogical practices. Reflecting on language pedagogy as related to an ethic of hospitality to strangers led me to focus on the kinds of images used in the classroom. I have found, for instance, that when I work with evocative black and white photographs of real individuals in real-life circumstances, complete with the challenges and ambiguities that they bring, and allow their stories to

extend over a week or two, or when I use art that speaks to the human condition, such as Käthe Kollwitz's drawings of hungry children, new possibilities emerge. When these are joined to a pedagogy that focuses on problem posing (Freire), and on careful sequencing of questions that move us from talking about surface details to talking about the situation represented and then the hopes and fears of those in it, empathy becomes a real pedagogical possibility without preventing effective language practice (Smith, "Teaching and Learning").

Practice and Imagination

Now consider these last two examples together. I described the effect on Zach's perceptions of language learning when he began to imagine the language classroom as a place for developing an ethic of hospitality as a result of my own intentional framing of the class. I also described how a Christian focus on love of neighbor began to reshape my pedagogical choices, challenging the choice of speaking cues, questions, and sequences. All of this still has to pass the bar of effectively assisting language acquisition, but it is also simultaneously grounded in other considerations, considerations tethered to faith. From the web of beliefs—beliefs about language, about learning, about students, about ethics, about the human calling—patterns of practice emerge. In the midst of this, over time, Christian faith can help to frame the way the pedagogical repertoire is shaped, not as a quick path to the right answer but as a source of shared imagination that gradually reshapes practice.

It seems to me that this becomes most compelling when the different facets of what I have described meet, when all of the pedagogical moves (the opening group conversation, the learning of names, the reorienting of speaking cues, the focus on hearing, the choosing of images and questions, and so on) happen together with explicit talk of a Christian ethic of hospitality to strangers. The intersections become most potent when the repertoire of practice and the contours of shared imagination begin to interpret one another and generate movement. The moves and the narrative infrastructure work together to create the experienced meaning of classroom pedagogy. Again, it is not that any of the individual

moves are somehow uniquely Christian, or that adding religious talk to the classroom is enough to declare it Christian; it is in the interplay between shared imagination and patterns of faithful practice that pedagogy informed by Christian faith emerges. Not just techniques. Not just words. Patterns of practice and webs of belief.

This process never quite arrives at a fixed destination. Practice is sufficiently fluid and open-textured that the intersection will never become a tight lockstep in which all meanings are fixed and final and everything is perfectly and only Christian. Thinking that it could be so would deny Christian accounts of practice, in which it is not we who can perfect ourselves, and all of our practices, even our best ones, are held open to the need for repentance (Dykstra; Plantinga Pauw). But it is possible to catch glimpses of wholeness that sustain the effort to marry faith and practice.

When imagination and repertoire drift apart, problems emerge. Cooling and Green describe the results of an empirical study of how teachers in Christian schools in England are using the approach to faith and pedagogy presented at www.whatiflearning.co.uk. This is a resource for Christian K-12 educators that I helped design, and it echoes the focus on connecting imagination and repertoire that I have been describing here. Cooling and Green describe successful appropriations of the *What If Learning* approach, where teacher and students are able to articulate the Christian imagination underpinning particular pedagogical moves that are consistent with it. They also describe an instance in which a teacher embraced only the imagination piece of the puzzle. This teacher added a Christian commentary to a class in which the patterns of pedagogical practice remained unchanged. The researchers found that both teacher and students found the episode “weird.” They were left with the sense that faith language was an odd intrusion, a change of topic not really related to the matter at hand. It had entered the classroom as an alien object, not as an elucidation of their shared practice. The result was like watching baseball while listening to basketball commentary: weird. Two outcomes seem plausible. One is that teacher and students will quickly conclude that faith has nothing much to do with teaching; since bringing the two together feels weird, the enterprise will be

quickly minimized or abandoned. The second is that through repetition and acclimatization teacher and students will stop finding the juxtaposition weird, and will come to accept the pattern of saying one thing while doing another as normal, perhaps even as deeply Christian due to the dogged investment in oral confession. Neither outcome seems desirable.

Attending to repertoire and imagination together, and to how meaning emerges at their intersection, offers a more fruitful wrestling with faith and pedagogy than just trying to act kindly on the one hand or adding religious devotions and Bible texts on the other. Structuring pedagogy to involve attentiveness to others, recognition of each person, intentional learning of names, welcoming postures, other-oriented oral practice, images chosen for their potential to elicit empathy, and so on, makes it possible to also talk about love of neighbor and hospitality to strangers and have it make sense as an illuminating and orienting verbal dimension of our practice. The moves and words become part of an infrastructure that enables and sustains a particular imagination; the shared imagination helps interpret the moves and words and their relationship. Students may become able without straining to find Christian meaning in the pedagogical patterns that form our classroom repertoire. I suggest that the tired dichotomy between preaching the faith and relying on the silent witness of good character is not useful for illuminating how classrooms work. It is neither the Christian talk alone nor the mute doing alone that makes pedagogy Christian; it is the interplay and the sense of meaning that it sustains.

This is NACFLA's twenty-fifth anniversary, and the beginning of its life as CAWL. Implicit in what I have tried to describe here is the suggestion that it is worth continuing the attempt to describe carefully the role that Christian faith might play in our language pedagogy, as well as our literature pedagogy. I think we need more detailed work along these lines. This will be work that does not accept a division of labor between literary theory on the one hand and various disciplines tethered to linguistics on the other. It will be work that asks more multifaceted questions about pedagogy and formation in foreign language classrooms and therefore necessarily draws on tools from outside of literature and culture study and applied linguistics, one example being the social prac-

tice theorists from whom I have been implicitly drawing in this account. It will involve critical questioning, thoughtful experiment, and careful description of our practices and of what they mean, to us and to our students. I hope to see continued headway on these fronts.

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LYING ACROSS CULTURES: IMPLICATIONS FOR WORLD LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION AND ACQUISITION

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IS THE CONCEPT OF LYING the same across languages? Coleman and Kay (1981) proposed a semantic analysis of the English word lie, arguing that a strong lie contains three elements and that utterances lacking an element are still lies but to lesser degrees. Replicated in Saudi Arabia, Ecuador, Spain, and with advanced Spanish learners, the data support the general idea of a prototypical lie; however, Spanish speakers may assign a different order of importance to the semantic elements. Native Spanish speakers also scored certain responses as strong lies, but advanced Spanish learners did not. Although all cultures allow certain kinds of lies, language learners are not always aware of what is acceptable. Examples are offered to support the claim that cultural contexts are more important than the semantic notions. Since lying is morally objectionable yet common within any given culture, the study includes implications for Christian foreign language educators. While the social lie is difficult to interpret, its effective use can serve as a buffer to avoid offense and help bridge cultural and linguistic boundaries.

Introduction

The study of lying has a long history in the disciplines of religion, philosophy, and psychology. Linguistic approaches, however, are relatively recent, and not surprisingly, literature on the teaching of lying or acquisition by second language learners is virtually non-existent. Nevertheless, speakers are regularly untruthful, often for non-deceptive reasons involving politeness. In fact, as Coleman and Kay (1981) proposed in their seminal article, instances of lying fall along a spectrum where social lies are more accepted than so-called bald-faced lies.

Definitions

Numerous definitions have been proposed for lying (for example, Bok 1978; Reboul 1994; Carson 2010). From a linguistic perspective, lying is a pretended speech act of information (Castelfranchi and Poggi 1994). Combining previous definitions of lying, Coleman and Kay (1981:28, hereafter C&K) argue for a semantic prototype, or a graded semantic categorization. They claim that the three most important elements of a lie are an untrue statement, a belief that an utterance is false, and the intent to deceive the hearer, as depicted below.

- (1) a. Proposition is false. [+false]
- b. Speaker believes Proposition to be false. [+belief]
- c. In uttering Proposition, Speaker intends to deceive Addressee. [+intent]

There are degrees of lying and types of justifiable or socially acceptable lies. Whereas lying typically involves intentional misrepresentation, other common types of lies include a justified lie (for example, to preserve one's life), a white lie (where the truth is potentially disadvantageous to the hearer), a fib (or small lie that is selfishly motivated), and social lies (where politeness is more important than the veracity of the assertion—for example, ritual greetings and leave-takings that often involve misrepresentation due to politeness considerations) (see Fraser 1994:152).

Nevertheless, white lies, social lies, and fibs may still be lies since they convey false information intended to mislead. At the same time, they are to some extent justified by the harmlessness of the message. Castelfranchi and Poggi (1994:276) argue that deception only occurs if the untruth is knowledge that the hearer needs and if the hearer's behavior would be importantly different if the information were provided correctly.

Acceptability

Even within major religious traditions, there are noted exceptions to telling the truth. For example, the Talmud allows three exceptions that are roughly equivalent to untruthful modesty about knowledge of the Talmud, untruthfulness regarding one's marital relations, or untruthfulness regarding reception by a host (Bok 1978:73). In her study of lying in Arabic, Cole (1996:482) states that Mohammad granted exemptions to truth telling in order to protect one's life in battle and to bring about reconciliation. In the Christian tradition, Erasmus acknowledged that all falsehoods were not lies (Bok 1978:47). Aquinas believed that all lies were wrong but that helpful lies or lies told in fun were pardonable, whereas malicious lies were not (BBC 2010). And Luther went even further, defending lies that were necessary or useful to the church (Verhey 1999). Although the Bible explicitly teaches against lying, there are examples of deception that turned out well (such as the midwives in Exodus 1:15-21 who did not follow Pharaoh's order to kill Hebrew boys and Rahab's lie to protect Israelite spies, recorded in Joshua 2:5).

Cross-Cultural Interpretations of Lying

Interpretations of lying are not the same across languages and cultures. For example, Blum (2005) indicates that whereas North Americans focus on a contrast between truth and lying, in China the contrast between deception and reality is more important. Yeung et al. (1999) also found that American English speakers considered Chinese speakers' indirectness as constituting intentionally deceptive acts, whereas the Chinese respondents viewed their indirectness as polite ways to avoid

hurting others' feelings. For Latin America, Danziger (2010) and Penesi (2013) argue that the extent of damage caused by a lie determines its acceptability both for the Maya of Belize and the Ceará of Brazil. Aune and Walters (1994) also found that lying was used as an acceptable politeness strategy to avoid conflict in Samoan culture.

Among the Tzeltal of Mexico, lying relates to cultural indirectness. Brown (2002:243) argues that for the Tzeltal notion of *lot* "lie, non-truth, mistake," the strongest lie criterion is that a statement must indeed be false (C&K's least important element for English) and that the weakest element is whether or not the speaker believes the statement to be false (C&K's most important element). Consequently, Brown (2002) and Ochs Keenan (1974) argue that collectivistic cultures hold different attitudes to individual responsibility for the truth of statements (Brown 269-70). Sweetser (1987:45) further suggests that a falsehood can only be intended to deceive if the truth-value is assumed to be relevant; that is, the information is beneficial to the hearer. At times politeness needs and informational requirements are in conflict when speakers are unsure as to which setting is most relevant.

Linguistic study of lying in Spanish is scarce. Travis (2006:208) mentions an unspoken but well-known cultural rule in Colombian Spanish whereby if one knows that something will make another feel badly one should not say it and instead say good things. Mealy et al. (2007) found that Euro-Americans considered lies to be more acceptable than Ecuadorians and that Ecuadorians rated self-flattery as the least acceptable type of lie. Both groups found it acceptable to lie to maintain positive relationships with others.

Lying in a foreign language is problematic since second-language learners rely on their first language pragmatic system when identifying lies and may incorrectly interpret social situations involving untruthfulness (Eichelberger 2012). For instance, in a Canadian study of cheating, native English speakers indicated a lie bias toward non-native speakers in contrast to a truth bias when observing native-language speakers (Da Silva and Leach 2013). Study participants were unable to determine when non-native speakers were lying versus telling the truth. The research suggests potential biases and miscommunication associated with

lie detection for non-native speakers of a language.

Due to variations both within and across languages, students should learn to accurately detect lies and to produce social lies when required in order to appropriately communicate within a given cultural context. Indeed, in certain settings, direct truthfulness can be both offensive and more morally reprehensible than so-called white or social lies. It is for this reason that even Christian language educators might consider teaching students what constitutes a lie and how social lies may be perceived differently than in English.

Method and Analysis

Recall that C&K's (1981) analysis demonstrated that a prototypical lie contained three elements [false, belief, intent] and that utterances lacking one or more of the elements were still considered *lies* but to lesser degrees. Their experiment utilized situations containing possible permutations of the three elements, and participants were asked to judge their degree of certainty that the situations contained a *lie*. The study was later replicated in Arabic with similar findings. Hardin (2010) also replicated C&K's analysis in Ecuador adding five stories with cultural situations where a *lie* might commonly occur yet be acceptable to native speakers. Finally, Eichelberger (2012) replicated the Spanish study for speakers in Madrid and also for advanced learners of Spanish (hereafter L2) in the United States.

The questionnaire appears below; the translation and semantic elements are provided but did not appear on the actual survey tool.

Spanish Questionnaire

(1) *Carlos ha comido la torta que Julia iba a servirles a sus invitados. Julia le pregunta a Carlos, "¿Comiste la torta?" Carlos responde, "No." ¿Mintió Carlos?*

Carlos has eaten the cake that Julia was going to serve to her guests. Julia asks Carlos, "Did you eat the cake?" Carlos responds, "No." Did Carlos lie?

[+false], [+belief], [+intent] Prototypical lie.

(2) *Juan y Geraldo están jugando al fútbol con la pelota de un amigo, Ricardo. Geraldo pierde la pelota de Ricardo. Cuando Ricardo llega y ve que sus amigos no tienen su pelota, le pregunta, “Juan, ¿perdiste mi pelota?” Juan responde, “No, Geraldo lo hizo.” ¿Mintió Juan?*

Juan and Geraldo are playing soccer with a friend Ricardo's ball. Geraldo loses Ricardo's ball. When Ricardo arrives and sees that his friends do not have his ball, he asks, “Juan, did you lose my ball?” Juan replies, “No, Geraldo did.” Did Juan lie?

[−false], [−belief], [−intent] Not a lie.

(3) *Gordito cree que tiene que pasar por la dulcería para llegar al salón de videojuegos, pero está equivocado porque la dulcería se ha mudado. La mamá de Gordito no aprueba los videojuegos. Mientras Gordito sale de la casa con el intento de ir al salón de videojuegos, la mamá le pregunta adónde va. Él dice, “Voy por la dulcería.” ¿Mintió Gordito?*

Gordito [‘Fatty’] believes that he has to go past the candy store in order to get to the video arcade, but he is mistaken because the candy store has moved. Gordito's mom does not approve of videogames. While Gordito is leaving the house with the intent of going to the video arcade, his mom asks him where he is going. He says, “I'm going to the candy store.” Did Gordito lie?¹

[+false], [−belief], [+intent] Half-truth; unintended lie.

(4) *Una mañana Cristina tiene un examen de matemáticas para el cual no ha estudiado, así que no quiere asistir a la escuela. Le dice a su mamá, “Estoy enferma.” Su mamá le toma la temperatura y a Cristina le sorprende saber que realmente está enferma. Más tarde en el día le da el sarampión. ¿Mintió Cristina?*

One morning Cristina has a math exam for which she has not studied, so she does not want to attend school. She says to her mom, “I'm sick.” Her mom takes her temperature and Cristina is surprised to find out that she really is sick. Later in the day she comes down with the measles. Did

1. Eichelberger (2010) notes that Situation 3 would have been more revealing had the wording been changed to “Voy para la dulcería.” I'm going to the candy store.

Cristina lie?

[−false], [+belief], [+intent] Half-truth; unintended truth.

(5) *Hidalgo tiene una invitación para cenar en la casa de su jefe. Después de una noche pesada de la cual nadie disfrutó, Hidalgo le dice a la anfitriona, “Gracias. Fue una fiesta magnífica.” Hidalgo no cree que fuera una fiesta magnífica y realmente no está tratando de convencerle a nadie de que se divirtiera, sino que sólo se preocupa por decirle algo amable a la esposa de su jefe, sin importar el hecho de que no cree que ella lo va a creer. ¿Mintió Hidalgo?*

Hidalgo has an invitation to eat dinner at his boss’s house. After a boring evening that nobody enjoyed, Hidalgo says to the hostess, “Thanks. It was a magnificent party.” Hidalgo doesn’t believe that it was a magnificent party and he really is not trying to convince anyone that he had a good time, but rather he is concerned about saying something nice to his boss’s wife regardless of the fact that he doesn’t think that she will believe it. Did Hidalgo lie?

[+false], [+belief], [−intent] Social lie.

(6) *Juan y María recientemente empezaron a ser novios. Valentino es el ex-novio de María. Una noche Juan le pregunta a María, “¿Has visto a Valentino esta semana?” María contesta, “Hace dos semanas que Valentino está enfermo con la gripe.” De hecho hace dos semanas que Valentino está enfermo con la gripe, pero también es verdad que María tuvo una cita con Valentino la noche anterior. ¿Mintió María?*

Juan and Maria recently started going together. Valentino is Maria’s ex-boyfriend. One night Juan asks Maria, “Have you seen Valentino this week?” Maria answers, “Valentino has been sick with the flu for two weeks.” Valentino has, in fact, been sick with the flu for two weeks, but it is also true that Maria had a date with Valentino the previous night. Did Maria lie?

[−false], [−belief], [+intent] Literally true statement;
false implication.

(7) *Dos pacientes están esperando ser llevados al quirófano. El médico*

indica a uno de los pacientes y dice, “¿Es este paciente la apendicectomía o la amigdalectomía?” La Enfermera Cerebral acaba de leer las carpetas. Aunque desea quedarse con su trabajo, se ha equivocado sin querer, y ha confundido las carpetas y contesta, “La apendicectomía,” cuando de verdad el pobre paciente es el que espera la amigdalectomía. ¿Mintió la Enfermera Cerebral?

Two patients are waiting to be taken to the operating room. The doctor indicates one of the patients and says, “Is this one the appendectomy or the tonsillectomy?” Nurse Cerebral has just read the two files. Even though she wishes to keep her job, she has confused the files and answers, “The appendectomy,” when in reality the poor patient is the one awaiting the tonsillectomy. Did Nurse Cerebral lie?

[+false], [-belief], [-intent] Honest mistake with grave consequences.

(8) Superaficionado tiene entradas para el partido campeonato y tiene mucho orgullo de tenerlas. Las muestra a su jefe que dice, “Escucha, Superaficionado, cualquier día en que no llegas al trabajo debes tener una mejor excusa que esto.” Superaficionado dice, “Sí, la tendré.” El día del partido campeonato Superaficionado se piensa estar sano y llama al trabajo. Le dice a su jefe, “No puedo ir al trabajo hoy porque estoy enfermo.” Irónicamente resulta que Superaficionado no puede asistir al partido porque el pequeño dolor de estómago que sintió al despertarse más tarde se volvió en una fuerte enfermedad intestinal. Entonces Superaficionado verdaderamente estaba enfermo cuando lo dijo. ¿Mintió Superaficionado?

Superfan has tickets for the championship game and is very proud of having them. He shows them to his boss, who says, “Listen, Superfan, any day in which you don’t come to work you should have a better excuse than this.” Superfan says, “Yes, I will.” The day of the championship game Superfan thinks himself to be healthy and calls work. He tells his boss, “I can’t go to work today because I’m sick.” Ironically, it turns out that Superfan cannot attend the game because the small stomachache that he had upon waking later turned into a strong intestinal illness. So Superfan really was sick when he said so. Did Superfan lie?

[-false], [+belief], [-intent] Intended lie; unintended truth.

(9) *Carlota recientemente llegó a Tena por primera vez y no conoce la ciudad. Ella está caminando y necesita saber cómo llegar a la casa de una amiga. Le da la dirección de la casa a la dueña de una zapatería y le pregunta, “Necesito ir a este lugar. ¿Dónde está?” Aunque la dueña de la zapatería no conoce el sitio, le dice a Carlota, “Vaya recto hasta la esquina, doble a la derecha y camine tres cuadras más.” ¿Mintió la dueña de la zapatería?*

Carlota recently arrived in Tena for the first time and she isn't familiar with the city. She is walking and needs to know how to get to a friend's house. She gives her friend's address to the owner of a shoe store and asks her, "I need to go to this place. Where is it?" Even though the shoe store owner is not familiar with the location, she says to Carlota, "Go straight until you get to the corner, turn right, and then go three more blocks." Did the store owner lie?

[+false], [+belief], [-intent] Social lie.

(10) *Teresa acaba de comprar un vestido nuevo. Al llevarlo por primera vez, le pregunta a su esposo Jacobo, “¿Me queda bien?” Jacobo responde que sí aunque en verdad piensa que el vestido es feo y demasiado apretado. ¿Mintió Jacobo?*

Teresa just bought a new dress. Upon trying it on for the first time, she asks her husband Jacobo, "Does it look good on me?" Jacobo responds, "Yes," even though he really thinks that the dress is ugly and too tight. Did Jacobo lie?

[+false], [+belief], [-intent] Social lie.

(11) *Norma es dueña de una tienda de alimentos. Susanita hace compras en la tienda y está buscando galletas hoy pero no hay. Susanita le pregunta a Norma “¿Para cuándo tendrá las galletas?” Norma responde, “Para el miércoles.” En verdad, Norma no sabe cuándo llegarán las galletas y sabe que es improbable que lleguen el miércoles pero no quiere decir que no sabe. ¿Mintió Norma?*

Norma is the owner of a food store. Susanita shops at the store and is looking for cookies today, but there aren't any. Susanita asks Norma, "When will you have the cookies?" Norma responds, "Next Wednesday." In reality, Norma doesn't know when the cookies will arrive, and

she knows that it is unlikely that they will arrive on Wednesday, but she doesn't want to say that she doesn't know. Did Norma lie?

[+false], [+belief], [-intent] Social lie.

(12) *Isabel necesita depositar dinero en su cuenta bancaria. Ella entra en el banco y ve que hay dos filas. Le pregunta a un señor que hace cola, "¿Esta cola es para hacer depósitos?" El señor le contesta que sí sin saber que él mismo está confundido y que realmente es la cola para retirar dinero en vez de hacer depósitos. ¿Mintió el señor?*

Isabel needs to deposit money in her bank account. She enters the bank and sees that there are two lines. She asks a man in line, "Is this the line for making deposits?" The man answers that it is without knowing that he himself is confused and that really it is the line for withdrawing money instead of depositing money. Did the man lie?

[+false], [-belief], [-intent] Honest mistake with minor consequences.

(13) *Teresa le invita a su amiga Josefina a asistir a una fiesta de cumpleaños esta noche en su casa. Josefina sabe que no puede asistir y que no va a asistir porque tiene que preparar una presentación para su trabajo esta noche, pero no quiere ofenderle a Teresa. Josefina le responde, "Sí, me gustaría ir. Nos vemos esta noche." ¿Mintió Josefina?*

Teresa invites her friend Josefina to attend a birthday party tonight at her house. Josefina knows that she can't attend and that she is not going to attend because she has to prepare a presentation for work tonight, but she doesn't want to offend Teresa. Josefina responds, "Yes, I would like to go. See you tonight." Did Josefina lie?

[+false], [+belief], [-intent] Social lie.

Table 1 reflects the degree to which speakers considered each of C&K's stories to contain a lie. Scores ranged from the perfect prototypical lie score of 7 to a non-lie score of 1.

Table 1: Comparison of Mean Scores for All Studies

Story Number	Spanish Ecuador	Spanish Madrid	Spanish L2	English	Arabic
1 (cake)	6.86	6.74	6.93	6.96	6.74
2 (lost ball)	1.32	1.14	1.37	1.06	1.24
3 (candy store)	4.10	3.24	4.84	3.66	3.63
4 (math exam)	5.90	5.95	5.21	5.16	4.67
5 (boss's party)	5.93	5.44	4.60	4.70	4.31
6 (ex-boyfriend)	4.84	4.12	4.56	3.48	3.19
7 (hospital)	4.75	3.98	3.63	2.97	1.94
8 (tickets to game)	5.16	5.37	5.12	4.61	4.27
9 (directions)	6.21	5.86	5.42		
10 (dress)	5.98	5.93	5.40		
11 (store)	6.21	6.12	4.93		
12 (bank)	3.00	2.00	3.02		
13 (invitation)	6.33	5.84	5.60		

Table 2 lists the story numbers in ascending order based on their mean score. That is, the story ranked as the least prototypical lie is on the far left and the most prototypical example of a lie is on the far right. Despite some similarities, the order differed slightly for native Spanish speakers who ranked Story 3 as low on the lie continuum.² The strongest determiner for a lie in Spanish was [belief], consistent with C&K's results, as also shown in Table 2. C&K, however, argued that the second most important feature was [+intent]. In other words, when examining the two groups of stories, those containing [+belief] and those with [-belief], they found that the stories with [+intent] scored higher than those with [-intent]. The Spanish studies, however, did not support this argument, since there should have been fewer elements of a lie in stories to the left of the scale. Instead, respondents in native-speaker Spanish studies rated Story 3 as less of a lie than Stories 6 and 7, even though Story 3 has two

2. The order for Stories 4 and 5 was reversed in the Ecuador study; however, the difference in scores was not statistically significant.

prototypical elements of a lie and Stories 6 and 7 have just one element.

Table 2: Comparison of Intent to Deceive in Stories

Order of Semantic Features: false, belief, intent

	(---)	(+--+)	(+--)	(--+)	(-+-)	(-++)	(++-)	(+++)
Spanish (Ecuador)	2	3	7	6	8	4	5	1
Spanish (Madrid)	(---)	(+--+)	(+--)	(--+)	(-+-)	(-++)	(++-)	(+++)
	2	3	7	6	8	5	4	1
English/Arabic	(---)	(+--)	(--+)	(+--+)	(-+-)	(-++)	(++-)	(+++)
	2	7	6	3	8	5	4	1
L2 Spanish	(---)	(+--)	(--+)	(++-)	(+--+)	(-+-)	(-++)	(+++)
	2	7	6	5	3	8	4	1

Furthermore, after analyzing the additional situations containing white or social lies in Spanish, it became apparent that these stories with [-intent] had even higher lie scores than those with [+intent], the intent to deceive. This finding was contrary to C&K’s theory that stories with more prototypical elements of a lie would score higher than those without such elements.

Second Language Learners

Second language learners did not pattern like native English nor Spanish speakers. Eichelberger’s (2012) study examined data from advanced Spanish language learners at various universities in the U.S. (senior and graduate-level students). Few participants were “very sure” of their answers, instead indicating a reluctance to make absolute judgments about lying. The advanced L2 learners scored the additional situations on the Spanish survey as much lower on the lying continuum than native speakers did. Instead, upon recognizing the stories as common social situations, unlike native speakers, the L2 students did not classify them as lies at all. This finding supports Koike’s (1989) and Pearson’s

(2006) hypothesizes that even though students may be aware of pragmatic conventions in a second language, they still may reject their use due to transfer from their first language pragmatic system (Eichelberger 2012).

Discussion

The Spanish results suggest that native speakers viewed stories containing social lies as obvious lies but without the intent to deceive. Consider a comparable scenario in the United States. A non-native might consider “Let’s do lunch sometime” as a future invitation, whereas a North American English speaker might only express general interest in the person or a nice idea without any specific intent to follow through. Although the statement is intended to build rapport, it can take newcomers some time to realize that the statement is a social lie of the type [+false, +belief, -intent].

A similar example further illustrates that lies are understood within a cultural context, and that one cannot deceive if everyone knows what is meant. A missionary in Ethiopia observed a colleague dying in the hospital, his abdomen swollen as though he were pregnant. When asked how he was, he replied that he was “fine.” The listeners were not deceived, so was it a lie? It was a social lie without deception. Similarly, Ashley (2011) described a situation in the Solomon Islands where a colleague frequently was asked to lend his boat, often by people who would not adequately care for it. Wanting to protect his equipment, the colleague asked a respected local pastor for cultural advice. The pastor advised him not to make the loan and to instead decline by saying that he had lost the key. Everyone would know the key was not lost since it was hanging on the wall in plain sight, so they would understand the message without being offended. This was considered to be a non-reprehensible lie of the type without deceit.

Stories 9 (Directions) and 11 (Store) are common in Ecuador and are viewed as lies, but without deceit. Why? The desire to maintain a relationship supersedes the need for truth or accuracy. The woman gives directions because she does not want to appear unhelpful or unfriendly. Likewise, the shop owner wants to keep the client happy. In Sweetser’s

(1987) terminology, the stories are not truth-value relevant and therefore are acts of politeness. Instead, a greater principle of friendliness and maintaining relationships is at work mitigating the force of the lie.

The Spanish studies analyzed three questions that can be applied to teaching languages:

(1) Is *lie* a word in Spanish whose definition indeed involves a prototype in the sense discussed by C&K? Yes. Language teachers should be aware of prototypical lies in a given culture.

(2) Does the prototype contain C&K's three elements? The notion of intent to deceive most likely should be determined according to cultural relevance (whether or not everyone knows the intent of the speaker even when the intent superficially appears to be deceptive) and other pragmatic factors such as politeness. Students need to understand social lies within their linguistic context since these are the most difficult to interpret as outsiders.

(3) Did participants generally agree on the relative weights of the elements of the semantic prototype of *lie*? The relative ranking of semantic elements in the Spanish data differs from C&K's order for English. Language students should learn that attempts at constructing or identifying lies may be culturally inaccurate and based on their first-language intuition.

Conclusion

Deception in English occurs when false information is given in a context when true information is required, whereas for Spanish, deception can also arise when a speaker fails to demonstrate *confianza* "trust in a relationship" and/or *calor humano* "warmth, friendliness" (Travis 2006). Even for informational settings, the prevailing standard for Spanish may be to help and give information (regardless of its accuracy) in order to maintain a relationship or be regarded as friendly. Since all cultures allow certain types of lies (Hardin 2010), one must understand what is a culturally unacceptable deception. Lying is complicated and highly nuanced and is therefore unlikely to be comprehended by second-language learners without some degree of explicit instruction and experience. Un-

fortunately, a lack of understanding about lies in a cross-cultural setting may lead to incorrect moral and ethical judgments, confusion, impoliteness, or miscommunication. The language educator's role is to keep students from imposing American culture in cross-cultural contexts, and although it seems counterintuitive, to explain the complicated relationship between social lies and politeness. Christian language instructors have an even more complex task of differentiating between cultural constructs and adherence to their own doctrinal views of truth.

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TOWARD A CHRISTIAN ECOCRITICAL APPROACH TO SIXTEENTH-CENTURY FRENCH LITERATURE: MONTAIGNE AND DU BELLAY

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LITERARY CRITICISM on ecological issues has largely focused on texts from the English tradition (post 1800s) and often identifies certain interpretations of scripture as revelatory of an anti-environmental eschatological framework that, they argue, originates and exacerbates our current ecological crisis. However, French Renaissance literature complicates those readings of the Christian tradition by providing alternative models that challenge and engage with both traditional biblical exegesis (such as Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica and Augustine's City of God) and modern environmentalist concerns.

Twenty-five years ago, literary criticism in the American and British Academies began to seriously turn its attention to the representation of nature in literature. This movement, frequently referred to as "ecocriticism," focused its investigations on the representation of nature with its ultimate goal being a reevaluation of the relationship between humans and non-human nature. Unfortunately within this context, Christianity has been singled out as one of the main contributors to our current environmental challenges. Most notably, Lynn White Jr.'s essay, "The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis," identifies Christianity's influence in the shift to a dualistic comprehension of the world that "[makes] it possible to exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of natural

objects” (1205).¹ Later critics, such as Lawrence Buell, similarly point out that certain readings of scripture are used to interpret God’s mandate to Adam and Eve to take “dominion” over the creatures of the world and “subdue” them as a way to justify humanity’s use and misuse of the world’s natural resources; most notably, Buell notes that passages from Genesis and Revelation have been blamed “as the root cause of western technodominationism” (2).

Nevertheless, there has been a shift both in environmentalist and Christian discourses which has opened the fields to more constructive dialogue. Already by the late 1990s, Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Grim formed *The Yale Forum on Religion and Ecology*, which has been influential by creating scholarship, forming environmental policy, and in the “greening of religion.” Similarly journals such as *The Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture* have started to collect a body of texts that engage ecological concerns from a religious and Christian perspective, and as late as last year, Pope Francis published an encyclical on the environment.² After all, if it is true that the Christian narrative focuses on our journey from the garden through different dispensations, culminating in an apocalyptic stage that introduces the establishment of a new city, it is also true that this narrative is not complete without the redemption of the non-human world.³ As Tucker and Hitzhusen argue,

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1. Although White’s essay was first published in 1967, it has since become a foundational document for modern ecocriticism.
 2. In his letter, Pope Francis reminds us that modern environmental concerns had already started to be addressed in 1971 by the Catholic Church by Pope Paul VI, and he adds that Pope John Paul II “became increasingly concerned about this issue” (4-5). Similarly, Tucker and Hitzhusen show a significant increase of interest in the topic, citing a rise in articles in the American Theological Library Association database after the establishment of the National Religious Partnership for the Environment and the Religion and Ecology Group of the American Academy of Religion in the early 1990s. Their survey found a steady increase of abstracts found in the Ecology Abstracts database starting in the early 2000s (373). Another, though controversial, testament to this “Earth Stewardship” movement is the Green Bible published by Harper Collins in 2008—a Bible with selected environmentally-friendly verses, such as the one cited, highlighted in green. For a critical analysis of this text, see Fröhlich.
 3. Cf. Grim and Tucker 23.

“Given the urgent need to promote a flourishing, sustainable future, the world’s religious communities have much to offer because the attitudes and beliefs that shape most people’s concept of nature are greatly influenced by their religious worldviews and ethical practices” (368).

Yet, even within some attempts to integrate the Judeo-Christian tradition into the ecological discourse, doubts remain regarding their compatibility—not the least because of our tradition’s “particularist claims to truth” and belief in radical transcendence (Grim and Tucker 15, 23). Although Grim and Tucker suggest that religion represents both problems and promise for ecologically-sound theory and praxis, they seem to focus on a generalized spirituality described as “spiritual attitudes toward the environment” (18). Likewise, they seem to have an explicit preference for eastern traditions such as Confucianism and Daoism because they “remain, in certain ways, some of the most life affirming in the spectrum of world religions” (23).⁴

Skepticism toward Christianity, moreover, is also raised on exegetical grounds. In “The Bible vs. Biodiversity,” James Nash correctly affirms the anthropocentric purpose of the Bible, boldly stating that, “the Bible is in the main ecologically unconscious” (214). Noting the human-focus of inspired scripture, Nash suggests that the biblical canon as a whole reflects a kind of “ecological antipathy” that is at odds with ecocritical discourse (230). Adding to the anthropocentric intent of the Bible, Nash forecloses the possibility for a tenable ethical argument for sustainability based solely on biblical authority by characterizing such attempts as an anachronistic use of an ancient text for legitimating a current concern (215).

Although Nash starts out by rejecting a “biblical” approach, his article goes on to signal the possibility of creating a pro-ecological ethical argument based on reason and biblical principles and traditions. Indeed, the need for engaging this topic from a Christian perspective seems inescap-

4. This distinction and preference for eastern spirituality is already present in Lynn White’s work. James Nash is an exception to this trend. Rather than basing ethical practices on a biblically-based ecological theology, he argues for an exegetical approach that processes a dialogue between experience and Christian tradition through the faculty of reason.

able.⁵ Even in Lynn White Jr.'s 1967 essay, for example, White ends his essay by pointing to a religious figure, Francis of Assisi, as a guide to follow (1206-07).⁶ The question, then, is not whether Christianity is incompatible or even antagonistic to ecocriticism, but rather, how can Christian thought enter into productive dialogue with ecocritical discourse?

I would suggest that the analysis of Early Modern texts can help articulate alternative modes of relating to non-human nature in ways that engage our faith tradition, and which might help us adapt and adopt new ways of thinking and living, thus leading to a more prosperous future for all of creation. Indeed, although like Christianity, Early Modern humanism has been characterized as an ideology that “thoroughly divorced the human from the animal species and considered the earth as a whole the former’s natural inheritance” (Harrison 92), I would argue that it too can benefit environmental studies in spite of its anthropocentric concerns. If it is true that during the Renaissance man took center stage, we should also note that those anthropocentric studies explored the limits of humanity. And, although a large part of the references to nature in this period are not primarily based on empirical observation but rather on literary authority, they also appear at the cusp of a rupture with ancient models of knowing the world and modern science; they thus open a perspective that could complement the modern-scientific-technological discourse with which we are more familiar.

Contrary to Harrison’s claim, rather than simply divorcing human

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5. In “L’exigence écologique chrétienne,” Jean Bastaire suggests that our ecological crisis is not merely an economic, ethical, or technological problem, but rather a philosophical and religious one, but as Timothy Burberry notes in “Ecocriticism and Christian Literary Scholarship,” although for the last ten years some attempts have been made by Christian scholars to enter into conversation with ecocriticism, a sustained consideration of ecocriticism as a viable theory for Christian scholars has not yet been offered (189).
 6. Although I agree that the Christian tradition and core convictions can help develop a theoretical framework for “sustainable” ecological praxis, I remain somewhat skeptical of the faith put on the faculty of reason in Nash’s program. Similarly, it is worth noting that White’s use of Franciscanism as a guide is done against the grain of Christianity: he characterizes Francis of Assisi’s thought being received by traditional Christianity as “unorthodox,” “radical,” and even “heretical” (1205-06).

concerns from non-human nature, Early Modern authors often situated humanity *in relation to* non-human nature and the divine.⁷ As Erica Fudge argues, “[Renaissance] concepts of human status in religious, humanist, legal, and political writings were in part motivated by an understanding of the nature of animals” (3).⁸ Thus, exploring the reduction of the distance between the human and the non-human in relation to the Divine might help us develop alternative paradigms for discussing key issues such as subjectivity, identity, alterity, as well as ethics and politics—central issues to Christian faith that reflect an overlap between social justice and environmentalism.

In “Of Cruelty” and the “Apology,” for example, Michel de Montaigne develops a “Franciscan” ethics of humility that lessens the distance between animals and humans as a way of highlighting the distance between creatures and Creator. As many have suggested, the “Apology” rejects as presumption and arrogance the differentiation between animals and humanity on the basis of reason, language, and virtue among others, thus challenging the assumption of human complete sovereignty over non-human nature (II.12 330ff).⁹ Likewise in “Of Cruelty,” Montaigne arrives at an ethical conclusion that appropriates and challenges the Christian tradition. After rehearsing many of the arguments that suggest the similarity between humans and animals, Montaigne writes,

[A] Even if all this were lacking, still there is a certain respect and a general duty of humanity that attaches us not only to animals, who have life and feeling, but even to trees and plants. *We owe justice to men, and mercy and kindness to other creatures that may be capable of receiving it.* There is some relationship between them and us, and some mutual obligation. (II.11 318; emphasis added)

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7. Pico della Mirandola’s description of humanity as being able to determine its situation—either elevating toward the angels and God, or descending toward the animalistic is paradigmatic of this.
 8. Cf. Jerry Nash, “The Christian-Humanist Meditation on Man: Denisolt, Montaigne, Rabelais, Ronsard, Scève,” 354.
 9. Cf. Melehy, “Montaigne and Ethics: The Case of Animals,” and Zalloua, “Montaigne and the Levinasian Other.”

Montaigne's emphasis on this duty recalls and radically departs from traditional arguments for our complete, "natural," and divinely ordained mastery over nature based on biblical and medieval theological authority.

Indeed, in *The City of God*, Augustine argues that the commandment forbidding killing could not apply to animals by citing the Great Chain of Being, which situates humans just below the angels and above the animals because humans bear the image of God.¹⁰ Augustine claims that humans have no obligation to animals because they do not share similar natures. Augustine writes, "Some try to extend the commandment ['Thou shall not kill'] even to wild and domestic animals and maintain that it is wrong to kill any of them. Why not extend it to plants?" After qualifying such reasoning as "ravings," Augustine adds that ". . . we do not understand this phrase ['Thou shall not kill'] to apply to bushes, because they have no sensation, nor to the unreasoning animals . . . because they are not partners with us in the faculty of reason" (32-33; bk. 1:20). The extensionist argument that Augustine refutes (extending mercy, respect, and kindness to plants and animals) is precisely the argument that Montaigne's "Apology" proposes and develops as a critique of human presumption.

Furthermore, Montaigne's emphasis on the similarity across creation evokes the relationship that Thomas Aquinas establishes among different creatures and humans. Aquinas writes that man in a certain sense contains all things because in his reason, he is like the angels; in his sensitive powers, like the animals; and in his natural forces, like the plants ". . . so according as he is master of what is within himself, in the same way he can have mastership over other things" (895; question 96, 2). Whereas for Aquinas the folding of nature within the human leads to its domination, the relation of human and non-human on the basis of the sensitive powers of suffering leads Montaigne to an extensive ethics that includes animals *and* plants.

Montaigne's collapse of the animal/human distinction by grouping them together as sentient "creatures" to whom we have obligations is

10. This idea is at the heart of what White considers problematic in orthodox Christianity. See White 1205.

instructive because it sidesteps some of the obstacles faced by some key expansionist arguments. In *Writing for an Endangered World*, Buell signals the problems that arise from the arguments for extension of ethical treatment to animals that appeal to rights like Jeremy Bentham, and to sympathy like Charles Darwin (225-227). Montaigne's appeal to respect and mercy¹¹ based on a play of similarity and difference¹² rather than legal consideration or a simple positivistic narrative of magnanimity provides an alternative model that seems to avoid both the simple attribution of human reason and morality to animals as Bentham does, and the problematic rhetoric intimating a racial and species gradation as in Darwin's *The Descent of Man*.

Moreover, Montaigne's language of mercy and mutual obligation reorients the Christian tradition by emphasizing humanity's embodiment of the likeness of God in relation to nature: precisely because only humans are said to reflect the image of God, it is their "obligation" to reflect God's love and mercy to a creation that is "capable of receiving it." Indeed, Montaigne's text signals a parallel to the relation God has toward creation in the perception of and reaction to suffering: Just as the cries of the Israelites under the oppression of the Egyptians move God to intervene (Exodus 2:23), it is the sight and sound of suffering that moves Montaigne's sympathy:

[A] Among other vices, I cruelly hate cruelty, both by nature and by judgment, as the extreme of all vices. But this is to such a point of softness that I do not see a chicken's neck wrung without distress, and I cannot bear to hear the scream of a hare in the teeth of my dogs, although the chase is a violent pleasure. (II.11 313)

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11. Cf. Derrida's discussion of the problematic way of discussing "animal rights," and the shift to the question of responsibility and suffering as a starting point (through Bentham). The discussion for Derrida is not of a "power" attributed or denied to the other, but rather a vulnerability or lack of power (an "impouvoir") that is shared with the other (27-28).
 12. It is interesting to note that in the Renaissance the spectrum of life was understood in a more porous way as witnessed by François Rabelais, who identifies a transitional category of creation that was between animal and plants, "zoophytes" (595).

Although it might be unwise to take Montaigne's unwillingness to kill when hunting (II.11 316b) as a paradigm for Christian care toward the environment, the relation between animal and organic life that Montaigne posits does point us in the direction of a kind of politics of grace and covenant that might be worth pursuing.

Montaigne's interpretation, moreover, suggests that our relation to animals can be a guide to what our relation might be to other humans. He notes, "[A] Natures that are bloodthirsty toward animals give proof of a natural propensity toward cruelty" (II.11 316). In a way anticipating Giorgio Agamben, Montaigne suggests that our political relation to others can be deduced from our relation to animals. As Agamben puts it, the story of the origin of man, ". . . is what results from the caesura and articulation between human and animal. This caesura passes first of all within man" (79). Said another way, "In our culture, the decisive political conflict, which governs every other conflict, is that between the animality and the humanity of man. That is to say, in its origin Western politics is also biopolitics" (80). By breaking down the distinction between animal and human in the realm of cruelty, Montaigne signals to the impossibility of treating fellow humans inhumanly—that is, 'like an animal'—if our treatment of animals is not different from what we would expect for humans.

Montaigne's refusal to distinguish between human and animal suffering makes room for humans to reflect God's compassion and yet it unequivocally differentiates between the natural and the Divine, thus signaling a rejection of the simple equation of humanity with transcendent Divinity that White identifies as the "root" of the ecological crisis. The text that immediately follows in the first edition of the *Essays* reads,

[A] And so that people will not laugh at this sympathy I have with them [animals], Theology herself orders us to show some favor in their regard; and considering that one and the same master has lodged us in this place for his service, and that they, like ourselves, are of his family, she is right to enjoin upon us some respect and affection toward them. (ibid.)

Indeed, Montaigne's understanding of our relation to nature, which seemingly runs counter to Augustine and Aquinas, marks a distinction not between humans and animals as Harrison would suggest, but rather a distinction between *all* living, earthly beings and the Divine. It is perhaps also telling that he characterizes this humble perspective as coming from "Theology herself."

The essay that follows "Of Cruelty," the "Apology," develops precisely this theme of human humility in face of the Divine. Indeed, Montaigne's valuation of the non-human over the human in that essay reflects his rejection of our access to the "*metaphysical*" through knowledge (II.12 369-370a) as much as it highlights his critique of empirical science's claim to comprehend physical "nature" in the first place.¹³

Montaigne's double critique resolves in a reflective gesture that suggests that it is through our correct knowledge of ourselves—mediated through Divine grace—that a correct interpretation of the external world can emerge.¹⁴ The essay ends by calling Seneca's stoic desire for humanity to rise above itself useful but absurd: "[A] 'O what a vile and abject thing is man,' he [Seneca] says, if he does not raise himself above humanity!" and Montaigne adds, "[C] That is a good statement and a useful desire, but equally absurd" (II.12 457). Rather than naively accepting humanity's capacity to arrive at knowledge of nature and God on its own merit, Montaigne opts for an ontology of Grace: "[humanity] will rise, if God lends [it] his hand; [it] will rise by abandoning and renouncing [its] own means, and letting [itself] be raised and uplifted purely by divine grace; but not otherwise" (II.12 457).¹⁵

Although Montaigne's critique of human hubris seems to evoke a radical skepticism that denies all access to knowledge, the "Apology" concludes with what Mark Shiffman identifies as an articulation of a

13. "It is for God alone to know himself and interpret his works" (II.12 369a).

14. Cf. Jerry Nash, 359. Similarly, Greg Garrard argues that one place of hope for the ecological movement is that "individuals come to an authentic selfhood oriented toward right environmental action" (202).

15. This is the end of the "Apology" in all editions published during Montaigne's lifetime. The Bordeaux edition changes the text slightly. Cf. Donald Frame's footnote 66 on page 457.

Christian skeptical natural theology rooted on a hermeneutics of Grace (5-7). As such, it reveals a major blind spot in contemporary discourses that would study the world without reference to its Creator; but that is not the only blind spot one might identify. If we focus on the term *physis* and its Hellenistic connotations,¹⁶ the theme of temporality emerges in a way that is significantly different from the traditional ecocentric critical apparatus that focuses on “place” rather than time, but which is not unfamiliar to sixteenth-century authors.

For the ancient Greeks, Nature is the process of birth, growth, and decay.¹⁷ Nature is neither simply stable nor a unity that can be preserved as it exists.¹⁸ Following Plutarch, Montaigne highlights this temporal perspective in his conclusion of the “Apology” to suggest that we cannot absolutely know things that change nor can we, on our own accord, know an unchanging God.¹⁹ This idea of nature as “universal flux” or as a process of constant movement and change is in fact a concept that is central not only in Montaigne’s *Essays*, but also in Joachim Du Bellay’s

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16. Although Plato would alter the way that we think of nature by relegating “true” nature to the metaphysical sphere, even according to Aristotle’s *Physics*, “*physis*” represents the internal principle of change of a living thing that explains its capacity to change over time while retaining its identity (bk. II:193b 21-22).
17. Cf. Annie Merrill Ingram, who notes, “It is also that ‘thinking of our life in nature’ necessarily causes us to consider the very ground of our being and, eventually, to recognize that—like nature itself—we are all simultaneously both in place and in process” (2). Also Cf. Desan’s “Montaigne paysagiste.” Perhaps the conversation of life cycle also can include some studies already done on Rabelais’ contribution to the field of demography. See Jean-Noël Biraben, “Rabelais démographe et utopiste de la population.”
18. Cf. Greg Garrard’s notion of “post-equilibrium ecology,” Ch. 3; similarly, Donald Worster and Joel B. Hagen’s characterization of recent ecological theory that emphasizes indeterminism, instability, and constant change. Cited in Philips, “Eco-criticism, Literary Theory, and the Truth of Ecology” (580).
19. He cites Lucretius:
- Time alters all the nature of the world;
From one state to another all must change;
Nothing remains itself, but all things range;
Nature modifies all and changes all. (II.12 456)

Antiquités de Rome.

Although Du Bellay's collection of poems presents a meditation on the Roman Ruins that he saw during his time in Italy mediated through Latin and Italian intertexts, as Gilbert Gadoffre suggests in *Du Bellay et le sacré*, they can also be read as a meditation on the meaning of Rome's decline within his contemporary context and beyond (88-89). Rather than merely seeing the glory of an ancient civilization and the vision of an eternal city emerging from the ruins of Rome, Du Bellay finds a universal moral warning in the rise and fall of the ancient civilization. In his eighteenth sonnet, he captures the transformation of space over time by depicting the change of the land from a pastoral landscape to one filled by great palaces which, as we know from the first verse, were to be reduced to the heap of rocks in front of the poet:

Ces grands monceaux pierreux, ces vieux murs que tu vois,
Furent premièrement le clos d'un lieu champêtre:
Et ces braves palais, dont le temps s'est fait maître,
Cassines de pasteurs ont été quelquefois. (1-4)

The transformation of the land evokes the birth, growth, and death of Roman civilization as it is corrupted by the rise in power and prestige of the "*bergers*" and "*laboureurs*" who put on royal garments and arms respectively in the following quatrain.

The victory of time over human accomplishment and power is given a moral interpretation by the closing tercets that describe the movement toward empire ("*l'aigle imperial*") ending in the return of the land to a new pastoral rule precipitated by a judgment from heaven:

Mais le Ciel, s'opposant à tel accroissement,

Mit ce pouvoir ès mains du successeur de Pierre,
Qui sous nom de pasteur, fatal à cette terre,
Montre que tout retourne à son commencement. (11-14)

Du Bellay's text evokes a kind of moral judgment whose effects raise

important questions regarding both the fate of human and non-human nature within a Christian worldview, particularly since the image of Roman ruins cannot help but bring to mind the eschatological themes of death, judgment, and condemnation—especially to its original, primarily Christian readership. Indeed, it is due to the sin of pride that Rome brings destruction onto itself. In the third sonnet the link between destruction and pride is made even more explicit:

Voy quel orgueil, quelle ruine: & comme
 Celle qui mist le monde sous ses loix,
 Pour donter tout, se donta quelquefois. (5-7)

As the poet adds, “Rome Rome a vaincu seulement” (10). In effect, the poem serves as an epigram that reflects a moral perspective of the judgment that comes with arrogance as much as an observation of time’s effect on physical existence.²⁰

The moral aspect of Du Bellay’s treatment of imperial Rome’s ruins also echoes the judgment reserved for Babylon described in the book of Revelation, and as Gadoffre suggests, the apocalyptic book and its Old Testament sources serve as a crucial source that underlies *Les Antiquités*.²¹ Although Revelation poses several problems of interpretation, some key issues that are connected to our topic are largely uncontested and should be brought to bear, particularly as it concerns human relation to nature in light of interpretations of Divine judgment and the destruction of the world.

20. Some critics have already noted the multiple interpretations of this passage, evoked by the pronominal verb “se donter,” which could be interpreted either as a reflexive that signals Rome bringing judgment and punishment onto itself, or as a passive construction which merely signals the effects of time on Rome. Cf. Melehy, “Du Bellay’s Time in Rome: The *Antiquitez*,” 9.

21. “Le rapprochement avec l’Apocalypse pourrait sembler arbitraire à première vue, et pourtant, dans ces sonnets austères et parfois sibyllins on perçoit ça et là les traces d’une eschatologie, ne fût-ce que dans la manière dont le poète met en scène le Chaos. . . . Sous la plume de Du Bellay l’histoire romaine devient ainsi une parabole du destin de l’Univers et la chute de Rome [qui] annonce la fin des temps” (Gadoffre 140-141).

The author of Revelation can see the consequences of Roman arrogance already in the first century A.D. Like Du Bellay, John the revelator identifies Rome as the “great city that rules over the kings of the earth” (17:18) and sees the destruction in terms of its own guilt. The message from an angel explains Babylon’s fall in terms that would be echoed in Du Bellay’s poem:

Give back to her as she has given;
 pay her back double for what she has done.
 Mix her a double portion from her own cup.
 Give her as much torture and grief
 as the glory and luxury she gave herself. (Revelation 18:6-7)

The themes of the city’s destruction as a result of its own doing, as well as the critique of the city’s extravagance, resonate with Du Bellay’s text. And yet, it is precisely these types of apocalyptic images that have been leveled against the Christian tradition with respect to ecological concerns.

One of the main criticisms of the Christian tradition with respect to the end times is that the hope for the new heaven and new earth promised seems to set an indifferent or even antagonistic perspective toward the earth in which we live. After all, just as Du Bellay’s Rome (including its landscape) justly suffers its own undoing, in the sixteenth chapter of Revelation, the whole earth seems to suffer justly the wrath of God as it is ravaged by plagues: its living creatures of the sea are killed, and it is scorched by fire while, in one popular interpretation, raptured believers witness the destruction safely from heaven.

Such a judgment would seemingly be warranted not only as a consequence of arrogance, but as a result of sin as early as Genesis as well; since the Fall, judgment is pronounced both on humanity *and* nature: “To Adam [God] said, ‘Because you listened to your wife and ate fruit from the tree about which I commanded you, “You must not eat from it,” *Cursed is the ground because of you*” (3:17; emphasis added). Although the text foreshadows the negative effects of human misconduct on the land in both Revelation and Du Bellay’s poems, the snake (a natural creature) that tempted Eve is also punished as a free moral agent:

“So the Lord God said to the serpent, ‘Because you have done this, “Cursed are you above all livestock and all wild animals! You will crawl on your belly and you will eat dust all the days of your life”’ (3:14).²² It is noteworthy that although non-human nature is often affected by divine moral judgment, it is not always easy to ascertain its innocence or culpability in the scripture. Nevertheless, the possible conclusions drawn from these readings ought to spur a reevaluation of eschatological interpretations as well as a reassessment of how to construe a proper relationship to nature in the face of a fallen world and impending destruction. As Barbara Rossing argues, the suggestions that we need not care for this earth because a new earth is promised and that we should take a fatalistic attitude toward the plight of the environment are absurd because they essentially ignore the incarnational aspect of the New Jerusalem. Indeed, God “comes down” to dwell among humans not in a different earth, but in a renewed one (Revelation 21).²³

Still, it is crucial to remember that these apocalyptic images should also be considered both in light of their historical context and their intertextual references. In Du Bellay’s *Antiquités*, for instance, Rome points to biblical, mythical, and historical referents in order to make its moral argument.²⁴ Du Bellay’s vision locates not only Hellenistic and Roman

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22. Cf. Moritz, “Animal Suffering, Evolution, and the Origins of Evil: Toward a ‘Free Creatures’ Defense.” Moritz argues that in a certain Jewish tradition, even before the fall, animals are seen as moral agents that can choose to do evil and thus can both repent and be rightfully punished by God.
23. Cf. “Rapture in Reverse: Reading Revelation Ecologically, for the Love of Creation.” Likewise, even though we are promised a new heavenly body in 2 Corinthians 5:1, we ought not despise our present bodies, as Paul makes clear: “While we live in these earthly bodies, we groan and sigh, but it’s not that we want to die and get rid of these bodies that clothe us. Rather, we want to put on our new bodies so that these dying bodies will be swallowed up by life” (2 Corinthians 5:4); “And so, dear brothers and sisters, I plead with you to give your bodies to God because of all he has done for you. Let them be a living and holy sacrifice—the kind he will find acceptable. This is truly the way to worship him. Don’t copy the behavior and customs of this world, but let God transform you into a new person by changing the way you think” (Romans 12:1-2).
24. Cf. Gilbert Gadoffre’s assessment of the prismatic vision of history in the *Antiquités*: “Ce n’est pas seulement de la puissance de Rome qu’il est question ici, mais de

but also Christian themes in the fall of Rome: human pride and civil war *as well as* wickedness are marked as sources of Rome's destruction. In his twenty-fourth sonnet he links Rome's civil war and collapse to the mythical origin of Rome and the fratricide perpetrated by Romulus:

Vous détrempez le fer en vos propres entrailles?

Était-ce point, Romains, votre cruel destin,
Ou quelque vieux péché qui d'un discord mutin
Exerçait contre vous sa vengeance éternelle?

Ne permettant des dieux le juste jugement,
Vos murs ensanglantés par la main fraternelle
Se pouvoir assurer d'un ferme fondement. (8-14)

The superimposition of the Christian concept of sin on the interpretation of Roman history and myth also allows the image of the bloody fraternal hand to be recontextualized as an allusion to Cain's murder of Abel that superimposes a Christian narrative on the history of Rome from beginning to end. Rome thus stands for the sinful human condition and allows the poet to generalize the judgment it incurs: "Ainsi le monde on peut sur Rome compasser, / Puisque le plan de Rome est la carte du monde" (sonnet 26; 13-14).²⁵

But even when his primary focus, the consequences of sinful humanity, is anthropocentric, Du Bellay's text presents an image of judgment in

la « Monarchie », c'est-à-dire de la notion d'empire universel transmise des Babyloniens aux Mèdes, puis aux Perses, puis aux Macédoniens, puis aux Romains" (49).

25. It is interesting to consider that Cain is cast as a figure that is extremely at odds with nature and strongly identified with the city (Genesis 4:17): he originally avoids working the land and chooses instead to hunt, perhaps already signaling an antagonistic relation to nature; moreover, when he is punished for killing Abel, his curse is that the ground "will no longer yield its crops for [him]" (4:12). It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the city is also sometimes associated with wickedness: "Lord, confuse the wicked, confound their words, for I see violence and strife in the city" (Psalm 55:9).

which the representation of nature includes both a temporal and spatial aspect, and one which stands in contrast to the fate of human civilization. The land depicted in the eighteenth sonnet cited above changes over time from a pastoral, or natural, landscape to a great civilized empire with palaces, only to return to its origin. However, following Heraclitus' observation that, "[a]s they step into the same rivers, different and (still) different waters flow upon them" (Fragment 12), the return to the pastoral setting is not a return to the same origin, but rather to a new one. The return or repetition occurs with a difference as is evidenced by the way that, structurally, the "*monceaux pierreux*" return at the end as "*successeur de Pierre*." Similarly, the word "*pasteurs*" of the first quatrain returns in the tenth verse as "*sous nom de pasteur*," clearly functioning in a different way.

A clearer echo of Heraclitus' fragment is noticeable in the tercets of Du Bellay's famous third sonnet where the repetition of the word "Rome" and the referent to which it points emphasize change over time:²⁶

Rome de Rome est le seul monument,
Et Rome Rome a vaincu seulement.
Le Tibre seul, qui vers la mer s'enfuit,

Reste de Rome. O mondaine inconstance!
Ce qui est ferme, est par le temps détruit,
Et ce qui fuit, au temps fait résistance. (9-14)

Here the destructive effects of time on human cultural artifacts is highlighted as the hubris of a culture that would build an "eternal city" is punished by destruction;²⁷ ironically, the sonnet also explicitly identifies the Tiber river—nature—as the sole recognizable remnant of that great

26. As Melehy shows, Du Bellay had translated passages from Ovid that transmitted Heraclitus' image of the stream streaming ("Du Bellay's Time in Rome" 12).

27. Cf. "People, despite their wealth, do not endure; / they are like the beasts that perish. / This is the fate of those who trust in themselves / and of their followers, who approve their sayings" (Psalm 49:12-13).

city. For the poet it is the nature of this “mondaine inconstance” that the seemingly solid and stable cultural objects of the city have come to ruin while the natural fleeting and flowing river “withstands” the ravages of time, precisely because it was always already in the process of change.

The poem locates a fluid relation between nature and culture in which the river is already part of the city as much as the city is evoked by the river.²⁸ Indeed, just as the pastoral field evoked in the eighteenth sonnet, the river which was there before the erection of Rome’s walls by Romulus will be there after the fall of the empire—but it will not be the same river: it will now be what remains (“*reste*”) of Rome. Conversely, the river itself cannot be freed from its association to Rome—even before the establishment of the city, the river plays a crucial role in the narrative of Romulus and Remus.²⁹

Likewise, in Revelation, the image of Babylon is layered with meaning as it refers to first-century Rome as much as it does to Jeremiah’s Babylon (Jeremiah 50-51) and Exodus’ Egypt. It is telling that the passages of godly wrath in Revelation are introduced by the angels singing the song of Moses which tells of the liberation of Israel and the judgment of an unjust ruler and empire. One might even argue that in these passages the earth suffers as an effect of arrogant, toxic, and oppressive regimes that seek economic and political dominion over the earth and

28. Cf. Mackenzie, “It’s a Queer Thing: Early Modern French Ecocriticism,” who reminds us that we cannot think of the terms nature and culture as separate, but should rather think of nature-culture.

29. According to the legend of the foundation of Rome, Amulius overthrew his brother, Numitor, the King of Alba Longa, killed his sons, and forced his wife Rhea Silvia to become a Vestal Virgin to prevent her from having other sons who might oppose him in the future. Rhea, however, was either raped or seduced by Mars, and consequently became pregnant. She thus was considered to have broken her vows of chastity and had to be punished. Rather than killing Rhea, Amulius ordered that her infant sons, Romulus and Remus, be drowned in the Tiber River. But instead, they were placed in a basket which under the care of the river deity, Tiberinus, floated down the river and came to rest at the site of the future city near the Ficus ruminalis. Interestingly, the Christian narrative that Du Bellay superimposes—from both Genesis and Revelation—starts and ends with a river that is both the same and different, and which is linked to both the garden and the city (Genesis 2:10-14; Revelation 22:1-3).

which remain as blind to God's grace as to the suffering of their people. This reading reiterates Paul's image of a groaning, suffering earth waiting to be redeemed in his letter to the Romans:

. . . the creation waits in eager expectation for the children of God to be revealed. For the creation was subjected to frustration, not by its own choice, but by the will of the one who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself will be liberated from its bondage to decay and brought into the freedom and glory of the children of God. (8:19-22)

The present suffering of the earth as a consequence of a people who see no other meaning in their natural environment than what serves for immediate use and consumption reveals the yearning for a radical future filled with justice and peace, one best described by the prophet's vision of the lion and the lamb (Isaiah 11:69).³⁰

Du Bellay's poems, like Montaigne's essays, contrast human pride and wickedness with celestial power and justice as it unfolds the significance of the universal flux in moral terms. And even though his primary focus is anthropocentric, Du Bellay represents nature's resistance to inevitable destruction in a complex way that includes a temporal aspect in addition to the spatial one. The intersection of these authors' texts and the central themes of both ecocriticism and a Christian worldview ought to encourage further research in this field. For example, how might the tension between Du Bellay's pre-Socratic understanding of nature as *physis* (birth-growth-death) described above and his Christianized, Aristotelian opposition of matter and form, implicit in his assessment of Rome's loss of form,³¹ help us articulate the goals of the preservation of nature from a Christian perspective? Or what might Montaigne's "naturalist" tendencies of reading the Book of Nature as divorced from faith,³² and its relation to later epistemologies like Cartesian and Kantian mechanis-

30. Cf. Francis 5.

31. "Le corps de Rome en cendre est devallé" (sonnet 5).

32. See George Hoffman's "The Investigation of Nature."

tic and utilitarian models, teach us regarding alternative Christian ways of studying and understanding nature? Although such projects do not lend themselves to the confines of this paper, they might provide new pathways for better understanding our theological, scientific, and eco-critical inquiries.

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FORUM

The Forum is intended to promote dialogue by providing space for shorter pieces of writing, including opinions and suggestions, brief responses to papers, reports of research in progress, meditations, and descriptions of pedagogical strategies.

LOVING OUR NEIGHBORS: THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING CROSS-CULTURAL LIES IN THE CHRISTIAN WORLD LANGUAGE CLASSROOM

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THIS FORUM CONTRIBUTION is a companion to Karol Hardin's article on lying across cultures, found earlier in this issue. It is wholly appropriate for our author to explore the practical consequences of Hardin's conclusions as she is a co-researcher with Hardin and the "Eichelberger" cited throughout the article.

In the World Language classroom, educational goals and desires can vary greatly from student to student. Some students view learning a second language as an exciting opportunity to communicate cross-culturally.

Others begrudgingly view World Language as a required course to be endured as they work toward a different field of study. Still, with an ever-increasing number of non-English speakers living and working in the United States, it is even more important to impart a pragmatic awareness of social politeness on all second language students, regardless of their goals for second language learning. In the Christian World Language classroom especially, educators should prioritize making students aware of their own pragmatic system in their first language and introduce them to the idea of pragmatic variation in the second language. By doing so, even those students who may not continue World Language study beyond the minimum required coursework might leave the class with a greater cultural understanding in order to improve relationships with non-native speakers of English. In the following, I will discuss my technique for incorporating pragmatic instruction, namely social lies, in Christian Elementary Spanish courses.

The Elementary Spanish courses (Spanish I and II) are often a student's first experience studying a language other than his or her first language. As a result of studying a second language for the first time, the second language course offers a unique pragmatic perspective to the student's primary language. Because students rely on their first language system when interpreting and processing new second language data for production (Pearson 2006), we can assume that students first need to identify and recognize pragmatic concepts in their primary language. By illustrating situations involving social lies in English, instructors can more easily introduce the concept of a social lie and how that lie varies between English and Spanish.

In the Spanish I and II courses, students learn many politeness strategies, including asking for and offering help, making polite requests, and giving and receiving directions. The instructor introduces these skills first by providing a sample dialogue between native speakers so that the students view the interaction in a cultural context. As the students relate the interaction back to their primary language, they are comparing not only the syntax and semantics of the grammar, but also the pragmatic elements of the dialogue. These politeness strategies are similar in Spanish and English, especially at the elementary level. When students study

the giving and receiving of directions, however, there is an opportunity to introduce one social lie that can be perceived differently in Spanish than in English. The ninth story in Hardin's Spanish lie questionnaire illustrates a social lie where directions are given despite the fact that the speaker is not familiar with the location. The scenario is stated as follows:

(9) Carlota recientemente llegó a Tena por primera vez y no conoce la ciudad. Ella está caminando y necesita saber cómo llegar a la casa de una amiga. Le da la dirección de la casa a la dueña de una zapatería y le pregunta, "Necesito ir a este lugar. ¿Dónde está?" Aunque la dueña de la zapatería no conoce el sitio, le dice a Carlota, "Vaya recto hasta la esquina, doble a la derecha y camine tres cuadras más." ¿Mintió la dueña de la zapatería?

Carlota recently arrived in Tena for the first time and she isn't familiar with the city. She is walking and needs to know how to get to a friend's house. She gives her friend's address to the owner of a shoe store and asks her, "I need to go to this place. Where is it?" Even though the shoe-store owner is not familiar with the location, she says to Carlota, "Go straight until you get to the corner, turn right, and then go three more blocks." Did the store owner lie?

[+false], [+belief], [-intent] Social lie.

As Hardin notes, "From an English speaker's perspective, this lie most likely would contain all three of Coleman and Kay's elements; however, did the store owner really intend to deceive?" (Hardin 3206-3207). When Spanish II students were presented with this scenario, they considered this utterance to be a lie, but were puzzled about the intent to deceive. They asked why the woman would attempt to give directions rather than honestly saying she did not know. The students, relying on their primary language pragmatic system, did not understand that in this instance, the attempt to appear helpful was more important than whether or not the statement was actually true or false. This was an opportunity to teach students about the concept of *calor humano* "warmth, friendliness" (Travis 2006) and the importance of maintaining a friendly rapport over giv-

ing factual information. Even if a student does not continue studying Spanish past the Elementary and Intermediate levels, giving and receiving directions is an essential skill that students will most likely utilize for a long time after they have concluded their Spanish studies. For this reason, by receiving explicit instruction with examples of this kind of social lie in a cross-cultural setting, students are less likely to use their primary language pragmatic bias against native speakers of Spanish.

After using the ninth story example of a social lie in Spanish and providing the students with some background information regarding *calor humano*, I presented them with the eleventh story from the Spanish questionnaire. This story contains the same prototypical lie elements as the ninth story.

(11) *Norma es dueña de una tienda de alimentos. Susanita hace compras en la tienda y está buscando galletas hoy pero no hay. Susanita le pregunta a Norma “¿Para cuándo tendrá las galletas?” Norma responde, “Para el miércoles.” En verdad, Norma no sabe cuándo llegarán las galletas y sabe que es improbable que lleguen el miércoles pero no quiere decir que no sabe. ¿Mintió Norma?*

Norma is the owner of a food store. Susanita shops at the store and is looking for cookies today, but there aren't any. Susanita asks Norma, "When will you have the cookies?" Norma responds, "Next Wednesday." In reality, Norma doesn't know when the cookies will arrive, and she knows that it is unlikely that they will arrive on Wednesday, but she doesn't want to say that she doesn't know. Did Norma lie?

[+false], [+belief], [-intent] Social lie.

After discussing the ninth story and using social lies to appear helpful and polite, my Spanish II students were much less dogmatic in their condemnation of Norma in the eleventh story. One student aptly perceived, "Maybe Norma was just trying to be nice and wanted to show Susanita that she cares by making an effort to give her an answer." Although students admitted that in English they would consider this utterance to be a lie that was not socially acceptable, after studying the ninth story they

began to understand that in Spanish, sometimes politeness and human warmth are more important than factual information itself. As Christians, we strive to be relationship-focused in order to love others as Jesus commanded. Consequently, in a Christian education setting, students were eager to use *calor humano* to improve communication and relationships with Spanish speaking neighbors and friends.

After using these two scenarios in my Spanish II class, I have noticed students are more open-minded when studying dialogue examples of social situations. Instructors could use these sample scenarios to introduce social lies to students or create similar dialogues, readings, or videos that involve other types of social lies in Spanish. Improving communication and mutual understanding between native and non-native speakers of Spanish is a primary goal for the Elementary Spanish courses. As a Christian educator, my personal goal for my Spanish class is to remove the bias against native speakers of Spanish when miscommunication does occur and to improve rapport between students and the native speakers in their communities. With even the most basic knowledge of syntax and vocabulary, students are able to make comparisons between their primary and secondary language systems. For this reason, introducing social lies early in second language study provides students with a foundation of pragmatic awareness that they can apply in either future study or in everyday interactions with Spanish speakers.

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REVIEW

RELIGION AND THE PUZZLE OF MODERNITY IN KAFKA'S TIME AND WORK

Manfred Engel, and Ritchie Robertson, Editors. *Kafka und die Religion in der Moderne / Kafka: Religion and Modernity*. Oxford Kafka Studies 3. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2014. 296 pp.

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Franz Kafka's friend and editor, Max Brod, often spoke of the religion in Kafka's work, from the context of Judaism and Christianity in Europe to the settings and allegory that required the understanding of religious symbols, sacred spaces, and church teachings for their meaning. Yet throughout the twentieth century it was a rare Kafka interpretation that went beyond Kafka as alienated Jew or a purely secular reading. This volume of the Oxford Kafka Studies focuses attention on religion in Franz Kafka's context and works from eminent Kafka scholars. These theologians, historians, and literature scholars from Germany, the United States, and Great Britain met at the Oxford Research Centre in 2012 for an interdisciplinary symposium dedicated to exploring topics. The seventeen-chapter volume is divided into three sections: six essays that

speak to the historical and literary context of religion in Kafka's time, four essays focused on a complex understanding of Jewish modernity, and seven that take up specific elements of the "religious" in Kafka's work. The essays appear in their original German or English. Such a compilation does not project a single or complete exploration of the intersection of religion and writing in Kafka; instead the essays illustrate the relevance of this discussion as a touchstone for Kafka readers and researchers, as well as an invitation to further study.

In the first section, the authors George Pattison and Judith Wolfes depict the disruptions that modernity presents for established religion, often seen in light of the forms of the self and mysticism. Bernd Aueroch's essay establishes the frames of the debates of historicism in the early twentieth century and how Kafka operated in and on the peripheries of those frames, at times insisting on pre-modern readings of religious categories or choosing settings for his works that complicate an historical reading. The remaining essays in this section trace influences of Darwin in scientific thinking and Kierkegaard's early reception in Germany, showing how Kafka's study and engagement with these authors and their ideas are woven throughout his work.

The second section of the book uncovers the complexity of Kafka's position vis-à-vis religion and the world. A religious discourse that was developing in the work and thought of secularized Jewish authors such as Benjamin, Bloch, and Adorno had an impact on Kafka and his writing at the margins of this context; however, the essayists all note that this mode of inquiry has taken on added weight recently. Kafka's works and characters have been understood to reflect historical circumstances, but the topics discussed by Ritchie Robertson related to Kafka's *The Castle* and Stanley Corngold's chapter on *The Trial* seize on religious themes of mercy and the law respectively and show how Kafka's narrative casts the religious discourse and historical context in sharp relief. The essay by Daniel Weidner provides examples for how Kafka reflects theological categories such as the afterlife, epiphany, and salvation in the context of the modern world: distorted, inverted, disguised, and dissembled (155). The final essay of this section by Peter Thompson looks at Kafka through the same contemporary eyes and addresses whether hope can exist in

this context. His essay views Kafka's use of religious metaphor as a representation of the early twentieth century's concurrent themes of an apparent disappearance of faith and belief and a philosophy of negation; however, Thompson sketches the lessening of this negation in Kafka's work through hopeful traces. Thompson shows how Kafka masks or even forbids the image of hope but reveals its traces in the evidence of a force acting upon it, like gravity pulling a moon along a measurable, predictable orbit (178).

The last seven essays are more fixed on individual works or themes and interrogate religious questions, allusions, or symbols within the context of Modernity and Kafka's oeuvre. Where the previous section turns on a renewal of interest in the way religion writ large relates to Kafka, the final section pinpoints elements of religious significance, primarily in the late works. From 1914 to 1922, Kafka's output included aphorisms, parables, and the novels, *The Trial* and *The Castle*. Manfred Engel's opening essay provides an overview of Kafka's use of religion as a rhetorical and symbolic layer in these later works. While Engel doesn't explore the hidden hope of Thompson's earlier essay, he categorizes religion as a piece of the puzzle that aids in understanding Kafka's view of the world. Michael Neumann's essay takes up the compositional rhetoric of religion and illustrates Kafka's reliance on these forms to resonate with his readers, and Malte Kleinwort's discussion of dialogues in Kafka's novels provides evidence for why researchers are forced to position Kafka's novels as they relate to religion. Peter-André Alt's chapter examines aphorisms that Kafka wrote throughout an intensive seven-month period of introspection on morality, religion, and ethics.

The remaining three essays are most applicable to teaching Kafka texts and exploring religious symbols and stories. Irmgard M. Wirtz has an insightful essay on Kafka's "lost" sons, named and nameless. It addresses how Kafka forges visual, textual, and symbolic links in his texts with and between the Old Testament's sacrifice of Isaac and the New Testament's prodigal son in Luke. The father-son conflict is a favored generational trope of the twentieth century; however, Kafka's constellation of sacrifice (255) is characterized by distinct complications that Wirtz presents with textual and biblical examples. The final two chapters by

Bernard Dieterle and Gerhard Neumann address a well-known chapter in Kafka's novel *The Trial* in which the protagonist K visits a cathedral. Dieterle provides a detailed discussion of location, religious motifs, and light and underscores the dense layers of meanings Kafka makes use of in this Christian setting. Neumann's essay compares the cathedral chapter and a fragment "In Our Synagogue" to show Kafka's interest in not only the content of those sacred spaces, but also the practices, calendar, and rituals that create religious meaning.

In Franz Kafka's work, his relationship to religion(s) is undeniable but also disconcertingly veiled. The skepticism and uncomfortable questions permeating Kafka's works reach into every aspect of human life. Unsurprisingly, he draws upon traditional religious symbols, forms, and profoundly religious values surrounding sacrifice, honor, justice, and salvation in a time when the tragedy and horror of World War I had shattered belief systems both religious and philosophical. The volume's authors have addressed the context of the *Zeitgeist*—social, philosophical, and religious—with which Kafka was grappling. The reader of this collection will find avenues for further research and a fresh basis for positioning Kafka within a fractured world that appears acutely Kafkaesque.

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